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CITATION TO THE RECORD
The

Utah

State Tax Commission

("Tax

Commission") heard

evidence by Petitioner and Respondents regarding a determination
of the Uintah County Board of Equalization ("Board").

Citations

to the record will be abbreviated as follows:
Record on Appeal: R.
Transcript of the formal adjudicative proceedings:

T.

The Addendum includes relevant portions of the record, and
shall be cited to as "A." with the appropriate page number,
JURISDICTION
This matter is before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), and Rule 14, Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

The

Tax

Commission's

remand

of

the

case

for

determination of the fair market value of the subject property is
futile, serves no useful purpose and is, consequently, an abuse
of discretion, or arbitrary and capricious.
2.

The

Tax

Commission's

rejection

of

Petitioner's

appraisal of the market value of the subject property was based
on determinations of fact not supported by substantial evidence
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court.
3.

When the Tax Commission rejected Petitioner's appraisal

methodology it erroneously applied the law.
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4.

The Tax Commission failed to follow its own prescribed

procedures.
5.

The

Petitioner

Board's

valuation

to potentially

of

the property

confiscatory

subjects

taxes and

the Tax

Commission's failure to correct the overassessment is a violation
of Petitioner's constitutional rights.
The standard of appellate review of each of these issues is
set forth in the appropriate section.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is a review of an order of the Tax Commission
rejecting

Petitioner's

evidence

of

fair market

value and

remanding to the Uintah County Board of Equalization for the
submission of additional evidence.

Petitioner challenges the

accuracy of the Tax Commission's conclusion that Petitioner's
appraisal method

did not conform to the generally accepted

practices of the appraisal profession and its rejection of
Petitioner's evidence of fair market value.
Petitioner further claims that the valuation of the property
is confiscatory

andf

therefore, unconstitutional.

Finally,

Petitioner claims that remand for additional evidence is futile,
an abuse of discretion, or arbitrary and capricious.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The property at issue in this case is undeveloped land in a
remote area of Uintah County.
Shale

Land

& Minerals

Corp.

The above-named entities, Utah
("Utah Shale"),
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Uintah

Oil

Association

("Uintah Oil"), and Utah Oil Shales, Inc. ("Utah

Oil") (jointly "Petitioner"), own parcels of contiguous property.
Since 1981, the properties have qualified for assessment and
taxation as agricultural land pursuant to the Farmland Assessment
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502 (1) (a) (i) .

The property has been

utilized for grazing for the past sixty (60) years and leased for
grazing continuously since 1949. Although the property consists
of patented oil shale mining claims, none of the properties has
had minerals extracted, except in nominal amounts for testing and
discovery purposes, and none of the properties has ever been
operated as a mine.
For

the

Equalization

tax

year

1989, the

Uintah

County

Board

of

set the value of the land at $50.00 per acre,

resulting in a fair market value of $960,026.00 for the property
held by Utah Shale, $101,948.00 for the holdings of Uintah Oil,
and

$113,935.00

requested

that

for the holdings
the market

appraisal, be established

of Utah Oil.

value, based

Petitioner

on an April, 1989

at $4.00 per acre, or $75,400.00,

$8,100.00, and $9,000.00, respectively.
The Board's decision was, apparently, embodied in corrected
tax notices of 1989 assessments which valued the land at $50.00
per acre.

The companies appealed the decision of the Board to

the Tax Commission.

After taking evidence in formal adjudicative

proceedings on October 11, 1990, the Tax Commission issued three
separate orders dated March 28, 1991, which rejected Petitioner's
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requested fair market value.

The Tax Commission determined that

Petitioner's contract rents did not conform to the market rents
and

that/

in such a case, market

acceptable appraisal methodology.

rents must be used

for

The Tax Commission rejected

Petitioner's appraised fair market value as unreliable and also
found that evidence presented by the Board was insufficient to
indicate a reliable value, due to the Board's use of comparable
sales with little comparability.

The Tax Commission remanded the

case for further proceedings before the Board for the submission
of additional evidence.
Each company petitioned for a writ of review of the order
which rejected Petitioner's evidence of fair market value of the
property and which remanded the matter for further proceedings.
The Petitions have been consolidated for further proceedings in
this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
Petitioner

has been substantially prejudiced by unequal

assessment and made subject to potentially confiscatory rollback
taxes based on the unsupported market value of the property as
set by the Board and the Tax Commission.
fair

market

value

The Commission's

determination

of

is to be

reversed

if

unreasonable.

Where all the evidence required to fix market

value by generally accepted appraisal practice was presented in
the formal adjudicative proceedings, and no other substantive
evidence

is available, the Commission's
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refusal

to accept

Petitioner's
additional

appraised

evidence

discretion.

was

fair

market

value

unreasonable

and

and
an

remand

abuse

of

for
its

Further, the Commission's decision is arbitrary and

capricious because it is not based upon the relevant factors set
forth in the testimony

and documents

submitted

as evidence.

Remand would serve no useful purpose, and the Commission should
be ordered by this Court to correct the overassessment of the
property.
When viewed in light of the whole record before the Court,
the Commission's factual findings are not based on substantial
evidence.

Petitioner's evidence was presented by an expert in

ranch properties management.

The Board's evidence was presented

by a county employee, not qualified as an expert at the hearing.
The evidence shows that Petitioner's contract rents are within
reasonable range of the lease rates for similar properties; thus,
Petitioner's contract rents conform to the market.

Petitioner's

appraisal relied on comparable sales to fix the property's fair
market value.

The Commission's determination that it could not

accept Petitioner's

appraisal because

important data was not

included was contrary to the evidence.

The evidence has been

marshalled for the Court's review, and the substantial evidence
which

is

required

to

support

an

agency

determinations of fact is wholly lacking.

action

based

on

Petitioner's appraised

fair market value should be accepted by the Commission as the
fair market value of the property.
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The- Tax Commission was required to interpret the statutory
term "fair market value" and to apply the statutory term to the
facts of this case.
reviewed

The agency's interpretation of the law is

for error.

"Fair market value" is determined by

estimation of the sales price of the property by generally
recognized appraisal methods.

The Commission's refusal to accept

Petitioner's appraisal estimating the property's fair market
value by a generally accepted appraisal method constituted an
erroneous

interpretation of the statutory

term

"fair market

value" which this Court may reverse merely because it disagrees
with the agency's interpretation.
The

Commission

evidence, unless

is

required

inherently

to accept

uncontradicted

improbable or only within

the

possession of one party, as being true. The Commission's refusal
to accept Petitioner's uncontradicted evidence is reviewed for
error.
proving

The decision that Petitioner had not met its burden of
the Board's

valuation

incorrect

was based

on the

Commission's failure to follow prescribed procedures, for which
Petitioner is entitled to relief.
The

Board's

unsupported

and

incorrect

valuation

and

assessment of the subject property and the Commission's failure
to correct the overassessment

results in an unconstitutional

taking of Petitioner's property in violation of state and federal
constitutions.

The proposed remand denies Petitioner due process

because it sets an impossibly high threshold for proof necessary
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to

rebut

the

Board's

valuation.

The proposed

taxation is

confiscatory in that it exceeds the income generated annually
from the property's highest and best use and subjects Petitioner
to potentially excessive rollback taxes.

The Board's valuation

is not based on an assessment of fair market value, but is simply
an adoption of the Commission's arbitrary valuation of $50 per
acre, and unsupported by credible evidence.

Assessment at that

valuation effectively confiscates Petitioner's property.

The

proposed valuation is arbitrary and not based on fair market
value in contradiction of
Constitution,

which

§§ 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Utah

requires

that

valuations

be

uniform and designed to achieve a fair cash value.

reasonably
Although the

state's arbitrary valuation of $50 per acre provides uniformity,
it fails to achieve fair cash value in violation of the Utah
Constitutional provisions.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TAX COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT THE PETITIONER'S
APPRAISAL DID NOT RELIABLY FIX THE MARKET VALUE OF THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY AND ITS REMAND FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE
WERE BEYOND THE LIMITS OF REASON AND RATIONALITY AND,
THEREFORE, AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR, IN THE
ALTERNATIVE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.

A.

Unreasonable Action by Commission.
With regard to unreasonable actions of an agency, § 63-46b-

16(4) states:
(4) The Appellate Court shall grant relief only
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines
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that a person seeking judicial review has been
substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
•

• • •

(h) The agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated
to the agency by statute;
• • • •

(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious,
(A. 34-35)
In this case, Petitioner has been substantially prejudiced
by the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner's appraisal did
not conform to generally accepted practices of the appraisal
profession and, therefore, did not reliably establish market
value.

Petitioner

is subject

to unequal

assessment

and

potentially confiscatory roll-back taxes based on the unsupported
market value of the property adopted by the Tax Commission and
incorporated

by

the Uintah

County

Board

of

Consequently, this Court may grant Petitioner

Equalization.
relief

if the

agency's action is an abuse of the discretion delegated to the
agency by statute.
According

to

this

Court's

decision

in

Morton

v.

International, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 163 Utah Adv.
Rep. 34, 36 (Utah 1991), "an agency has abused its discretion
when the agency's action, viewed in the context of the language
and purpose of the governing statute, is unreasonable."

Morton

also holds that an agency action based upon facts not supported
by substantial evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Utah Adv. Rep. at 42, fn. 7.

163

Furthermore, relief may be granted
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when the agency has abused a grant of discretion contained in the
agency's governing statute.
The legislature,
granted agencies
statutory terms.
authority, courts
discretion may be

in many instances, has explicitly
discretion in dealing with specific
Apart from such explicit grants of
have also recognized that grants of
implied from the statutory language.

. . . .

However, it is clear from the wording of § 63-46b-16
that an agency's statutory construction should only be
given deference when there is a grant of discretion to
the agency concerning the language in question, either
expressly made in the statute or implied from the
statutory language.
Morton International, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.

It is necessary

to determine whether the Commission has been granted discretion
to construe the statutory term, "fair market value."

Absent a

grant of discretion, the Commission's construction will not be
given deference and will be reviewed for correctness.

Morton

Internationalf 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, fn. 38.
The Utah Legislature did not explicitly grant to the Tax
Commission discretion regarding issues of what constitutes "fair
market value" under § 59-2-102(2).

(A. 30)

This court made a

similar inquiry regarding the Commission's discretion to construe
the statutory term, "equipment", in MQrtpn International.

In

that case, taxpayer Morton sought review of the Tax Commission's
determination that the shells of Morton's production facilities
were not so specialized as to constitute "equipment" under Utah
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) and therefore be exempted from sales
and use taxes.

The Court determined that such a classification

by the agency could not be made using traditional methods of
- 9 -

statutory construction and that it was routinely the kind of
determination performed by the Commission.
basisf

this Court held

entitled

that

to deference.

IcL at 39.

the Commission's

Nevertheless/

On that

decision was

the decision of the

Commission would be overturned if its decision was unreasonable.
Ostensibly, in the case at bar, the Commission remanded this
case to the Board for assistance in the construction of the
statutory term, "fair market value."

Petitioner contends that a

remand for the taking of additional evidence is an abuse of the
agency's discretion because (1) adequate and credible evidence
required to fix the market value was presented at the formal
adjudicative

proceedings

evidence available.

and

(2) there simply

is no other

According to Uintah County Assessor Lorin

Merkley, comparable sales with which to compare Petitioner's
property are "as scarce as hen's teeth."

(T. 58)

On behalf of

the Board, Merkley offered smaller land tracts for comparison,
conceding that they were "the nearest to the type of land that
we're talking about that we can find for any sales."

(T. 62)

Even that meager evidence was eventually withdrawn by the Board.
(T. 64-65)
Petitioner admittedly has the burden of proof that the
Board's

valuation

is incorrect.

To that end, Petitioner

introduced credible and uncontradicted evidence of market value
through its expert, Steven F. Wiles, to support the appraisals
submitted

to the hearing

officer.
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The Board presented no

documentary evidence of market value.

Instead the Board relied

on the testimony of Mr. Merkley, a county employee not qualified
as

an

expert

at

the

hearing,

concerning

undocumented

and

unsubstantiated comparable sales which, in the Tax Commission's
view, were
acknowledge

not

comparable.

that

The

additional

Tax Commission

evidence

was

refused to

not

available.

Requiring the taxpayer to engage in the futile exercise of once
again scouring the land transactions within the relevant vicinity
of the subject property

is an unreasonable requirement which

constitutes an abuse of discretion from which the taxpayers are
entitled to relief.

B.

Arbitrary and Capricious Commission Decision*
The Commission's Decision is also arbitrary and capricious.

Federal administrative law cases frequently address the issue of
what constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct by an agency.
The Ninth Circuit describes the inquiry as "deciding whether
there has been a clear error of judgment and whether the agency
action was based upon consideration of relevant factors." United

States Vt Alpine i^and and Reservoir Co./ 887 F.2d 207, 213 (9th
Cir.

1989), quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. of the United

States Vt State Farm Mutual Automobile Inst Co,/ 463 U.S. 29, 43,
103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866, 77 L.Ed.2d

443

(1983).

In the present

case, the Tax Commission's Decision could not have been based
upon

the

relevant

factors

because

the

evidence

before

Commission clearly preponderated in Petitioner's favor.
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the

The Decision is a result of a clear error of judgment by the
Tax Commission.

Rather than basing the Decision on the relevant

factors set forth in the testimony and documents admitted as
evidence, the Commission simply remanded for additional evidence
which both the Board and Petitioner agree is not available.

The

Tax Commission must base its decision upon the relevant factors
or be found to be arbitrary and capricious.

See Carlsen v. State

of Utah, Department of Social Services, 722 P.2d 775 (Utah 1986).
In addition, the remand for additional evidence before the
Uintah County Board of Equalization
available.

This

Court

has

is futile where none is

stated

that

exhaustion

of

administrative remedies may not be necessary when it would serve
no useful purpose.

Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621

P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980).

This is such a case.

The remand

ordered by the Tax Commission prejudices Petitioner by delay and
the possibility

of confiscatory

roll-back

taxes without any

likelihood that the additional evidence the Commission demands
can be provided.

The Tax Commission has authority to correct the

valuation of property which has been overassessed pursuant to
R861-1-9A, Utah Administrative Code
directed by this Court to do so.
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(A. 38), and should be

POINT H
THE TAX COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S
APPRAISAL DID NOT RELIABLY FIX THE MARKET VALUE
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS BASED ON DETERMINATIONS
OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1988 at Section 63-46b16(4)(g) states:
(4) The appellate court shall grant
relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking
judicial review has been substantially
prejudiced by any of the following:
(g) the agency action is based
upon a determination of fact, made or implied
by the agency, that is not supported by
substantial evidence when viewed in light of
the whole record before the court
An
test must

appellate

court

consider

Commission's

both

factual

applying

the

the evidence

"substantial
that

evidence"

supports

the Tax

findings and the evidence that detracts

from the findings. Grace

Drilling

776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).

Co.

v.

Board

Q£ Review,

The Tax Commission's factual

findings are not supported by substantial evidence.

Instead, the

evidence detracts from its findings.
"Substantial

evidence"

is

that

quantum

and

quality

of

relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind
to support a conclusion.

Boston First National v. Salt Lake

County Board, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990).

Federal cases are

in accord with the standard of "substantial evidence" which the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires to support an agency
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action based on determinations of fact.

For example, the Ninth

Circuit defines "substantial evidence" to "mean more than a mere
scintilla."
1985).

Cranston v. Clark, 767 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir.

Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a

reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
Id.

In the case at hand, substantial evidence to support the

agency in its rejection of Petitioner's appraisal establishing
market value is wholly lacking.
The order of March 28f 1991, from which Petitioner appeals
set forth seven findings of fact and two conclusions of law. In
the section entitled "Decision and Order," ("Decision") (A. 1-21)
the Tax Commission made additional determinations of fact.

It is

these latter determinations which the Appellant challenges as
being unsupported by the evidence.
A.

The Finding That Current Market Rents For Similar Properties
Are Significantly Higher Than $.96 Per AUM Is Not Supported
by Substantial Evidence.
The measure

"AUM" is intended to reflect the number of

animals a particular

tract of land can support.

It is an

abbreviation of "Animal Unit Month", and is a number set by the
Bureau of Land Management indicating that the land has grazing
capacity to support one cow for one month or one sheep for five
months.

Nothing

in the record indicates how the Commission

arrived at the figure of $.96 per AUM.

The evidence before the

Tax Commission regarding current market rents for winter sheep
grazing was offered by Steven L. Wiles, a certified appraiser
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experienced in land management.
the

following:

visual

Mr. Wiles based his appraisal on

inspection of the property

(T. 28);

assessment of vegetation, soil condition, current use (T. 29);
assessment of the vegetation and soil characteristics of the area
(T.

30); examination

of

Bureau

of

Land

Management

Records

concerning the lack of any planned improvements in the area (T.
30); observation and assessment of road leading to the property
(T. 31); observation of soil erosion, elevation of the property,
assessment

of rainfall

and presence of overgrazing

(T. 32);

calculation of the number of animals the property could graze per
month

and

comparison

with the number of animal unit months

(AUM's) allocated by the BLM (T. 33-34); comparison with state
grazing leases' alloted AUM's (T. 35); evaluation of the effect
of

the

location

of

the

land

within

the

Indian

Reservation

(T. 36); assessment of comparable sales (T. 37); assessment of
potential mineral lease income (T. 41).
Mr. Wiles testified that the highest rent in the area for
winter sheep grazing on land that was comparable as to acreage,
vegetation, and within the Ute Reservation was $.23 per acre per
year.

(T. 49-50)

Under questioning by the Board, the witness

Edward M. Bown, an attorney with many years of experience with
the subject property, testified that the BLM and Forest Service
charged

$1.81 per head per month as a grazing

pasturing of cattle in 1989 ("AUM").

(T. 22)

fee for the
The remaining

testimony on the issue was offered by Lorin Merkley, Uintah
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County Assessor, who proposed as a hypothetical that the property
could be leased as cow pasture at $6.00 a month per cow times
2,670 AUMs

for a value of $160,200.00 annually.

(T. 53)

However, the Board offered no documentary evidence in support of
this assertion and presented

its evidence through a county

employee who did not demonstrate that he had conducted the type
of analysis

that

is consistent with

the type of analysis

performed by Mr. Wiles.
Petitioner

objected

to the Board's assumption

that the

property was appropriate for the use proposed by the Board.
(T. 47-48)

The Petitioner's testimony concluded that the land

was unfenced and could be used for herded livestock only.
53)

(T.

The testimony of the Board did not contradict Mr. Wiles'

evidence that comparable land rents were between $.08 and at $.23
per acre.

Thus, the Tax Commission's determination that current

market rents are significantly higher than $.96 per AUM is not
supported by substantial evidence.
B.

The Finding That Petitioner's Appraisal Relies On Contract
Rents Which Do Not Conform To Market Rents is Not Supported
by Substantial Evidence.
The Tax

Commission's Decision

found

that

Petitioner's

appraisal utilized contract rents which did not conform to market
rents to establish the fair market value of the property.

(R. 7)

"Fair market value" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(2) as
the amount at which property would change hands between a willing
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to
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buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant
facts,

(A. 30)

Commission

to

Petitioner's

There was no substantial evidence before the
establish

contract

that

rents;

market

neither

rents

was

differ

there

from

substantial

evidence that Petitioner's appraisal calculated the fair market
value of the property utilizing non-conforming contract rents.
1.

The contract rents conform to the market.

Evidence of

market rents was presented by Petitioner's expert, Steven I.
Wiles, whose appraisal cited comparable leases for winter sheep
grazing at either $.08 per acre or $.23 per acre.

(R. 22)

There

was testimony that the BLM and the Forest Service value an AUM at
$1.81 (T. 22) but no testimony as to how that figure relates to
rent-per-acre.

Petitioner presented evidence that the surface

use of each parcel of property generates $1,000.00 per year in
income.

(T. 17)

The appraised

lease value of the subject

property was $.16 to $.19 per acre per year.
The Board offered

(R. 22)

only the testimony of Lorin Merkley,

Uintah County Assessor, to establish market rents.

He presented

no evidence that the highest and best use of the property was
anything other than grazing.

(T. 54)

The Petitioner's expert

concluded that the highest and best use was for sheep grazing.
The Board produced no evidence that contradicted this conclusion
and produced no evidence to substantiate the Board's offhand
comment that the subject land could support cattle.

The Board

elicited testimony from Mr. Wiles that the lack of highway access
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to the subject property would affect the transportation of
animals to pasture.

(T. 44)

Based on the evidence before itf the Tax Commission could
not reasonably and rationally conclude that the value of the
Petitioner's grazing leases was less than the fair market rent
per acre.

Because of the nature of the land's remoteness, lack

of improvements, and poor condition, the property is difficult to
utilize.

(T. 28-36)

The Petitioner entered into an arm's length

lease with a third party.

That contract, in effect, establishes

the market rents.
2.

Petitioner's appraisal relies on comparable sales, not

income, to fix the property's fair market value.
with

acceptable

appraisal

practices

of

the

In accordance
industry, the

Petitioner's expert found comparable land leases and listed them
as a comparable

factor.

(R. 22)

The Petitioner's expert

rejected the income approach because all the parcels of property
had a negative income.

(T. 39)

Petitioner's appraisal set the

fair market value by the comparable sales method.
15)

(T. 39-40; R.

Therefore, despite the inclusion of comparable leases in

petitioner's appraisal, the Tax Commission's determination that
Petitioner relied on non-conforming contract rents to fix the
property's market value is not supported by the record.
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C.

The Tax Commission's Determination That Petitioner's
Appraisal Lacked Important Data Elements Was Not Supported
By Substantial Evidence.
The Tax Commission's

Decision observes that "the market

approach to value in Petitioner's appraisal makes adjustments
that appear to be very subjective and that are difficult to
support with reliable market data."

(R. 7; A. 3)

appraisal requires subjective evaluations.

Of course, an

Despite its statutory

definition in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(2), according to Rio
Algom Corpt vt San Juan County, 681 p.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1984),
"market value" is at best an approximation.
"Market value," the basis for all assessment
valuation, is an attempt to create a
fictitious sale of the subject property by
assuming an owner willing to sell and a buyer
desiring to buy
Rio

Algomf

681

P.2d

at

192, quoting

Ql

Matter

McCannel/

301 N.W.2d 910, 924 (Minn. 1980).
The Board's sole and non-expert witness acknowledged in his
testimony that comparable sales were extremely scarce.
Nonetheless,

using

Petitioner's

expert

professional

opinion

property.
information

(T. 27-42)

the

relevant

presented
and

information

market

established

(T. 62)

available,

data

to

support

value

of

the

his

subject

Despite the presentation of the relevant

available,

the

Tax

Commission

determined

that

Petitioner's appraisal was unreliable because it, supposedly,
omitted

the dates

when

the

comparables' exact acreage.

comparables

(R. 7)
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were

sold, and the

The

Commission's

conclusion

on

this

point

directly

contradicts the testimony of Steven L. Wiles who testified that
the comparables sold for cash within one year of the date of the
appraisal, April 1, 1989.

(T. 38) Wiles1 testimony is backed by

the additional evidence of the appraisals themselves.1
46)

(R. 13-

Those appraisals showf on page 14, the dates of sale of the

three comparables to be January 3, 1989, and November, 1988, (R.
26) two of the comparables having sold on the earlier date.
The Tax Commission was also clearly wrong when it decided
that Petitioner's appraisal omitted
acreage of the comparables.

important data regarding

Wiles' testimony was that the most

comparable tract of land, "Little Emma", was of the same acreage
as the subject property.

(T. 38)

Wiles' testimony further

identified the comparable tracts as "large tracts of land that
were put to the same use as the subject property was [put] that
were close to the subject property."
the comparables
property, that

(T. 37) When asked whether

were the same size

tracts as the subject

is, several-thousand-acre

replied, "thousands of acres, yes."

(T. 37)

tracts, Mr. Wiles
The exact acreage

of each parcel is set forth in the Petitioner's appraisals
1

Although the three Petitions for Review have been
consolidated in these proceedings, the record on appeal has not
been consecutively numbered by the Tax Commission. As a result,
there are minor page differences between the records for each
Petition. For the sake of clarity and brevity, Petitioner refers
to the pages as they are numbered in the file of Uintah Oil
Association, Petitioner, Case No. 910183, and to those of Utah
Shale Land & Minerals Corp., Petitioner, Case No. 910185, only
where different.
- ?n -

(R. 22) as 2039 acres (Uintah Oil), 2278 acres (Utah Oil) (R. 22)
and 19,200 acres (Utah Shale) (R. 23).
There

is

nothing

in

the

record

to

show

how

the

Tax

Commission arrived at its determination that Petitioner presented
insufficient evidence to fix the value of the property.

The

Board presented no documentary evidence regarding value of the
property.

(T. 65)

The County's sole witness who had not been

qualified as an expert testified that the County had not done a
reappraisal* of properties since 1982.

(T. 56-57)

The value of

the property which the Board claims to be $50.00 per acre (R. 6)
was based on the "value that the State of Utah carried on the
property when they turned it over to the County jurisdiction
about, oh, roughly a year ago . . . ."
proposed

no

competing

appraisal

for

(T. 56)

the

Tax

The Board
Commission's

consideration, nor did the Board elicit any testimony regarding
comparables' acreage or other information which served as the
basis of the Petitioner's appraisal.
testified

that

Petitioner's

expert

The Board's only witness
made

a

"pretty

fair

assessment" of the characteristics of the property appraised.
(T. 57) Accordingly, there was no evidence before the Commission
that

essential

data elements were omitted

from

Petitioner's

appraisal which would have made the Petitioner's determination of
fair market value unreliable.

This determination of fact by the

Commission is not supported by substantial evidence.

- 21 -

D.

The Tax Commission's Action Was Based on Determinations of
Fact Not Supported by Substantial Evidence,
The

Tax

Commission

remanded

this

case

because

the

Petitioner's appraisal did not reliably fix the market value of
the property at $4.00 per acre.
not contain the

As shown above, the record does

substantial evidence required to support the

agency action in its rejection of the market value established by
the Petitioner's evidence.
matter

Thus, it is error to remand the

to the Uintah County Board of Equalization

additional evidence.

to take

The error is compounded when the evidence

established that there was no other information available.

(T.

58, 62-63)
The

Board

presented

Commission's Decision.

no evidence

to support

the Tax

The evidence having been marshalled for

the Court's review, the record is clear that it is Petitioner who
presented uncontradicted substantial evidence establishing the
fair market value of the property.
POINT III
THE TAX COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER'S
APPRAISAL METHODOLOGY DID NOT CONFORM TO GENERALLY
ACCEPTED PRACTICES AND DID NOT RELIABLY INDICATE
MARKET VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW.
Determination

of

"fair market value" requires

the Tax

Commission to interpret and apply that statutory term to the
facts of this case.

The standard of this Court's review of the

Tax Commission's interpretation of the law is set forth in Savage
Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 160 Utah Adv. Rep.
- 22 -

5 (Utah 1991).

In Savage Industriesr petitioner sought review of

the Tax Commission's determination that subsidiary corporations
were not entitled to carry over their own pre-acquisition losses
in

determining

consolidated

their

returns.

annual

income

This Court

for

the

petitioner's

looked to section 63-46b-

16(4)(d) to determine the breadth of its review of the agency's
interpretation.
Under section 63-46b-16(4)(d), a court may grant relief
based upon an agency's erroneous interpretation of the
law.
This incorporates the correction of error
standard previously applied by Utah courts in cases
involving agency interpretations of law.
Savage Industries, Inc., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7 (Utah 1991).
As further guidance, this Court quoted the comments to the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act:
Paragraph (c)(4) includes two distinct matters—
interpretation and application of the law. With regard
to the agency's interpretation to [sic] the law, courts
generally give little deference to the agency, with the
result that a court may decide that the agency has
erroneously interpreted the law if the court merely
disagrees with the agency's interpretation.
Savage Industries F Inc.f 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8.
The term "fair market value" is defined in Utah Code Ann.
§59-2-102(2) :
(2) "Fair market value" means the amount at which
property would change hands between a willing buyer and
a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to
buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the
relevant facts.
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Since most properties are not actually bought or sold on
January 1, county appraisers must estimate the fair market value
of the properties as of that date using recognized appraisal
methods which are not set by the statute.

The three generally

recognized appraisal methods for determining fair market value
are the cost, income, and market/comparable sales approaches.

In

the instant case, Petitioner relied upon the comparable sales
approach because the income approach would have resulted in a
negative value.

As discussed in Point II, above, there was no

evidence before the Tax Commission to establish that Petitioner's
appraisal was defective or unreliable.

The fair market value

which serves as the basis for taxation of Petitioner's property
was

established

as the statute

required, by estimating

a

fictitious sale price.
Where Petitioner's appraisal estimated the fair market value
of the property by a generally accepted appraisal method, the Tax
Commission's

refusal to accept that estimate is an erroneous

interpretation of the statutory term "fair market value."

Under

the correctness standard set forth in Savage Industries, this
Court may decide that the agency's interpretation is wrong merely
because this Court finds that the fair market value of the
property has, in fact, been properly estimated.

Based on the

evidence before the Commission, the appraisal was reliable.
Petitioner

is, therefore, entitled
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to

relief.

The

Tax

Commission's

action

must

be

reversed

and

the

Petitioner's

appraisal value accepted as the fair market value.
POINT IV
THE TAX COMMISSION FAILED TO FOLLOW PRESCRIBED
PROCEDURES IN THE ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS.
Section 63-46b-16(e) provides for relief for a petitioner
who has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's failure to
follow prescribed procedures.
Code

(1989),

provides

Rule 861-1-70, Utah Administrative

that

"[t]he

Commission

will

accept

uncontradicted evidence, unless inherently improbable, as being
true."

(A.

37)

The

Commission's

failure

to

accept

uncontradicted evidence as true is reviewed as a question of law,
under the correction of error standard.

Morton Internationalf

163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37.
Petitioner has the burden of proving the Board's valuation
to be incorrect.

R861-1-7G, Utah Administrative Code (1989).

(A. 36)

861-1-7H, Utah Administrative

As Rule

Code

(1989),

requires, that value must be established by a preponderance of
the evidence.
1975).
fix

the

See Koesling v. Basamakis. 539 P. 2d 1043 (Utah

To that end, Petitioner introduced credible evidence to
market

value

of

the

property.

The

evidence

in

Petitioner's appraisal and the testimony of its expert witness
was uncontradicted.

The Tax Commission was required, therefore,

to assess the property upon Petitioner's appraised market value.
Petitioner has met the burden of proof on the issue of
market value of the property with credible evidence of value
- 25 -

which must be accepted as true,

The Commission's refusal to

accept the uncontradicted evidence subjected Petitioner to delay,
possible confiscatory roll-back taxes, and the futile efforts
required by yet another hearing before the Board.

Petitioner's

appraisal valuation must be accepted as the market value of the
subject property.
POINT V
THE TAX COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO CORRECT THE
BOARD'S VALUATION AND ASSESSMENT AND REMAND FOR
FURTHER EVIDENCE DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS,
IS CONFISCATORY, AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AS APPLIED TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
Judicial review of this issue is governed by Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-16(4)(a) which permits this Court to grant relief if
Petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by an agency action
which is unconstitutional.

Interpretations of state and federal

constitutions by an agency are to be reviewed under a correction
of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision.
See Savage Industries v. Utah State Tax Commission, 160 Utah Adv.
Rep. 5, 6 (Utah 1991) .
The Tax Commission heard credible evidence of the subject
property's fair market value but refused to correct the Board's
overassessment.

The Commission's assessment of the property

was based on the authority granted by the legislature in Utah
Code Ann. § 59-1-210(7):
The powers and d u t i e s of t h e Commission a r e a s f o l l o w s :
. . . .

(7) t o e x e r c i s e g e n e r a l s u p e r v i s i o n
over
a s s e s s o r s and county boards of e q u a l i z a t i o n , and over
-

26
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other county officers in the performance of their
duties relating to the assessment of property and
collection of taxes, so that all assessments of
property are just and equal, according to fair market
value, and that the tax burden is distributed without
favor or discrimination;
• • • •

(A. 27)
The Commission has promulgated

rules of procedure which

designate it the State Board of Equalization and permit it to
correct the valuation of property by County Boards.
Utah Administrative Code (1989).
that

the

Board's

unsupported

(A. 38)
and

R861-1-9A,

Petitioner contends

incorrect

valuation

and

assessment and the Commission's failure to correct it results
in an unconstitutional taking of Petitioner's property without
due process, in violation of state and federal constitutional
provisions.
A.

The Proposed Remand Is A Denial Of Due Process.
The demands of due process arise from a concept of basic

fairness of procedure.
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to
time, place, and circumstances. Rather, "the demands
of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of
procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the
case and just to the parties involved.
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) quoting Rupp
v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980).

In the case

at bar, Petitioner is denied due process by the Commission's
remand for further evidence in that the remand sets an impossiblyhigh

threshold

for

proof

necessary
- 27 -

to

rebut

the

Board's

valuation.

The Commission demands evidence whichf according to

the testimony
obtained.

of both Petitioner

and

the Board, cannot be

(T. 15, Lines 10-14; T. 58, 62f 63)

By setting an arbitrary and unreasonably high standard of
proof, the Commission ensures that Petitioner will be unable to
obtain sufficient evidence to persuade the Commission of the fair
market value of the property.

Remand is, therefore, futile.

The

Commission's act deprives Petitioner of its property in violation
of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the State Constitution.
B.

The Proposed Valuation Is Confiscatory.
The Commission's refusal to correct the overassessment of

the property

is also unconstitutional.

The Board's

1989

valuation of the property ranges from $40.00 to $53.12 per acre.
(T. 12)

As a result, the proposed tax burden is in excess OJL. the

total income generated annually from the property's highest and
best use.

Part of the tax in dispute is the amount of any and

all roll-back taxes.

In the event that the property ceases to

qualify for taxation under the Farmland Assessment Act, § 59-2502(1)(a)(i), (A. 33) taxation at the level proposed by the
Commission would be confiscatory.
Also in dispute is the difference between the tax claimed
due by the Board and the tax which would be assessed if the
property were assessed according to Petitioner's appraised value.
The Board's valuation of the property was not derived from any
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appraisal of the property.

The County simply adopted the Tax

Commission's

$50.00

valuation

credible evidence.

of

per

acre,

unsupported

by

(T. 56). That valuation does not satisfy the

fundamental principle that assessments reflect fair market value
so that each property is assessed in proportion to the value of
all property.

Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210(7).

(A. 27)

Assessment at the valuation of $50.00 per acre effectively
confiscates property determined to be worth only $4.00 per acre.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the only limitation
on Congress' power of taxation is where its exercise has been so
arbitrary as to not constitute a tax but, rather, a confiscation
of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Union Pacific m
493

(1915).

Brushaber v.

Co,, 240 U.S.I, 24-25, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed.

Surely

states

may

not confiscate

property by

arbitrary taxation.
C.

The Proposed Valuation Is Arbitrary And Not Based On Fair

Market Value.
Article XIII, section 2 of the Utah Constitution provides
that

"[a]11

tangible

property

in

the

state...be

taxed

in

proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law."
(A. 24) Article XIII, section 3 provides:
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and taxation on all tangible
property in the state, according to its value in money,
and shall prescribe by law such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of such property,
so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
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proportion to the value of his, her or its tangible
property....
(A. 25-26)
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution
establish the basic state policy that all taxable property bear a
just proportion of the burden of taxation.
16 Utah

86, 90, 50 P. 615, 616

Cunningham v. Thomas,

(1897).

To achieve

that

objective, the market or cash value of all property must be
ascertained
assessments.

and

used

as

the

common

denominator

for

all

Kennecott Copper v. Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d

1156, 1159 (Utah 1990).

These approximations of market value

must present reasonable uniformity.

"While absolute equality and

uniformity in the assessment of property is not practicable, a
requirement of reasonable uniformity and equality is essential."
Harmer v. State Tax Commission, 22 Utah 2d 324, 328, 452 P.2d
876, 879 (1969).
In Kennecott Copper, the county sought a declaration of this
Court that the statutory provision for assessment of Petitioner's
mining property by the "net proceeds formula" resulted in a nonuniform and unequal rate of taxation not based on the common
denominator of fair cash value, violating Article XIII, sections
2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution.

This Court held that sections

2 and 3 of Article XIII applied to the valuation of mining
property under section 4, stating that any valuation formula must
be reasonably designed to achieve valuation for assessment and
taxation, "as near as reasonably practicable equal to the cash
- 30 -

price

for which the property valued would sell in the open

market...."

Kennecott

Copperf

799

P.2d

at

1160,

quoting

Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah at 90, 50 P. at 615-616.
Petitioner in this case seeks an order to the Commission
requiring it to correct the assessment procedure which allowed
the

Board

Petitioner's

to

adopt

property

taxation purposes.

the

state's

unsupported

valuation

of

at $50.00 per acre for assessment and

As held in Kennecott Copperf

the valuation

procedure must be designed to achieve uniformity and a fair cash
value or be unconstitutional.

Arguably, the state's arbitrary

valuation of $50.00 per acre as adopted by the Board provides
uniformity, but it fails to meet the additional constitutional
requirement that valuation be based on the property's fair cash
value.

The Commission should be ordered by this Court to correct

this arbitrary valuation.
CONCLUSION
Remand of this case is arbitrary and capricious.

For the

reasons set forth above, Petitioner asks this Court to direct the
Commission to correct the valuation of Petitioner's property for
assessment and taxation purposes.
Respectfully submitted this

day of October, 1991.

Edward M. Bown
Attorneys for Petitioner
Uintah Oil Association and
Utah Oil Shales, Inc.
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
UINTAH OIL ASSOCIATION,
Petitioner,

)
]

v•
i
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF )
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; ]
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
]
Respondents.

Case No.:

910183

]
1 Priority 15

UTAH SHALE LAND & MINERALS ]
CORP., a Utah corporation,
;
Petitioner,

]

v•
t
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF |
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; ]
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
]
Respondents.

(Case No.:

910185)

(Case No.:

910200)

]

UTAH OIL SHALES, INC., a Utah \
corporation,
]
Petitioner,
v•
4
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF \i
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH;
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION,
]
Respondents.

;

ADDENDUM TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
UTAH OIL SHALES, INC.,

)

Petitioner,
v.

)

ORDER

)

COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF )
UINTAH COUNTY,
:
STATE OF UTAH,
)
:
Respondent. )

Appeal Nos. 89-2417 to
89-2422
Serial Nos. see attachment

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for a formal hearing on October 11, 1990.

Joseph G. Linford,

Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the
Commission.

Present

and

representing

the

Petitioner

were

R. Dennis Ickes, Attorney at Law, Edward M. Bown, Attorney at
Law,

and

Steven

L.

Wiles.

Present

and

representing

the

Respondent was Lorin Merkley, Uintah County Assessor.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is property tax.

2.

The

period

in

question

is

the

lien

date

January 1, 1989.
3.
of vacant

The subject property consists of 2,278.69 acres
land

Vernal, Utah.

located

approximately 65 miles southwest of

Appeal NOS. 89-24x7 tO 89-2422
4.

The

market

determined

by

the

$113,935.

Petitioner

value

Uintah

for

County

requests

the

subject

Board

a

of

market

property

as

Equalization

is

value

of

$9,000.

Respondent requests a market value of $113,935.
5.

The subject property has, at the present time, no

mineral, oil,

or mining

leases

upon

it.

It was

classified

approximately ten years ago as greenbelt property and has been
recognized

as

such

by

both

parties

since

that

time.

The

subject receives no revenues from the production of minerals,
but

only

from

winter

sheep

grazing.

Petitioner

receives at

least $1,000 per year from the grazing use of the land.

There

is no dispute in this case as to the subject's greenbelt status.
6.

Petitioner

submitted

its estimate of market value.

an appraisal

in support of

The appraisal is performed by

Petitioner's expert witness, Mr. Wiles, and values the subject
property

at

assumption

$3.95
that

to $4.00 per

the

highest

and

acre.

This

best

use

is based
for

the

on the
subject

property is for winter sheep grazing with little or no present
potential for mineral production.
7.

Respondent's

representative

testified

that

the

subject property is valued by Respondent according to the value
established
acre.

He

by
also

the

state

testified

in

1982, which

as to

several

is

$50

per

comparable

square

sales

of

significantly smaller tracts of land which sold within a range
of $40 to $160 per acre, but did not
support for this testimony.
-2-

submit

any documentary

Appeal Nos. 89-2^.7 to 89-2422

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Tax Commission
administration

is

of property

required

taxes

to

oversee

to ensure

the just

that property is

valued for tax purposes according to fair market value.

(Utah

Code Ann. §59-1-210(7).)
The Petitioner has the burden of proof
that the market value of the subject property

to establish
is other than

that as determined by the Respondent.
DECISION AND ORDER
The

method

of

analysis

utilized

in

Petitioner's

appraisal does not conform to the generally accepted practices
of the appraisal profession and the Commission finds that it is
insufficient
appears

that

as

a

reliable

Petitioner's

indicator

appraisal

instead of economic or market rents.
similar properties
rent

figure of

rather

$0.96

than

market

utilizes

(ninety-six

contract

value.

contract

It

rents

Current market rents for

are significantly higher

accepted appraisal methodology
used,

of

than Petitioner's

cents) per AUM.

requires that

Generally

market

or actual rents, when

rents

be

it appears

that the contract rents do not conform to the market.
The market approach to value in Petitioner's appraisal
makes adjustments that appear
are

difficult

important

data

to

support

elements

to be very subjective

with
are

reliable

not

market

supplied

by

and that

data.

Some

Petitioner's

appraisal, such as the actual acreage of its comparable sales
and the

sale dates.

It

appears

that

Petitioner's

value of

$3.95 to $4.00 per acre is substantially below market value for
similar properties in the area.

Appeal Nos. 89-24i7 to 89-2422

Respondent's
unsupported

and

comparability.

evidence,

utilizes
The

Tax

on

the

comparable
Commission

other

sales
finds

hand,

with

that

is

little

since

the

evidence presented by both parties is insufficient to indicate
a reliable value for the subject property, the matter should beremanded to the Uintah County Board of

Equalization

so

that

each party may have opportunity to correct the deficiencies in
its case and submit sufficient

evidence and

analyses

for

an

appropriate and accurate value to be determined for the subject
property.
The Petitioner
subject

property,

greenbelt
(FAA).

and

is appealing the market value of the
not

classification

its

under

value
the

The board of equalization

as

determined

Farmland

by

its

Assessment

Act

shall, therefore, determine

the actual market value of the subject property as of the lien
date, January 1, 1989may

make

a

Under the law, a board of equalization

determination

regarding

the

specific

level

of

classification to which a property is to be assigned under the
FAA, e.g.,

"Graze I," "Graze

appeal

the

to

board,

A

II," etc.,

board

of

if that issue is on

equalization

does

not,

however, have authority to make any determination regarding the
greenbelt values established under each classification.
present

case, the Petitioner

has

not

In the

appealed the greenbelt

classification of the subject property under the FAA, but has
only

appealed

greenbelt
authority

the

actual

classification.
and

market value.

market

value

The board

responsibility

to

of

independent

of

the

equalization

has

the

determine

the

actual

fair

Appe al Nos. 89-/

7 to 89-2422

Based upon the foregoing,

the Tax Commission

orders that

the case be remanded for further proceedings before the Uintah
County Board of Equalization for the submission of additional
evidence to address the points

indicated

in this Order.

The

board of equalization is authorized and ordered to be reopened
for this purpose.
DATED this

It is so ordered,
28

day of ° m ouu>JA J , 1991.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION

R / W. Hansen
Chairman

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

B. Pacheco
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petition for judicial review.
Utah Code Ann. §S63-46b-13(l),
63-46b-14(2)(a).
JGL/sd/1132w

-5-
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Appeal Nos. 89-2417 to 89-2422

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed—a. copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
Utah Oil Shales, Inc.
c/o Edward M. Bown
225 South 200 East, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Lorin Merkley
Uintah County Assessor
County Courthouse
Vernal, UT
84078
Amy G. Pope
Uintah County Auditor
County Courthouse
Vernal, UT
84078

DATED t h i s

3%

day of ^AQA^JL

Secretary

-6-

J

, 1991.

fT\

Appeal'Nos.'89-* 17 to 89-2422

ATTACHMENT
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL

NUMBER: 89
NUMBERs~89
NUMBER: 89
NUMBER: 89
NUMBER: 89
NUMBER: 89

2417
2418
2419
2420
2421
2422
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SERIAL
SERIAL
SERIAL
SERIAL
SERIAL
SERIAL

NUMBER:
NUMBER:
NUMBER:
NUMBER:
NUMBER:
NUMBER:

11-024-0001
11-025-0002
11-028-0002
11-029-0001
11-031-0001
11-032-0001

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
UINTAH OIL ASSOCIATION,

)

Petitioner,
v.

ORDER
)

COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF )
UINTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
)
Respondent.

)

Appeal Nos. 89-2411 to
89-2416
Serial Nos, see attachment

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for a formal hearing on October 11, 1990.

Joseph G. Linford,

Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the
Commission.

Present

and

representing

the

Petitioner

were

R. Dennis I ekes, Attorney at Law, Edward M. Bown, Attorney at
Law,

and

Steven

L.

Wiles.

Present

and

representing

the

Respondent was Lorin Merkley, Uintah County Assessor.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is property tax.

2.

The

period

in

question

is

the

lien

date

January 1, 1989.
3.
of vacant

The subject property consists of 2,038.96 acres
land

Vernal, Utah.

located

approximately 65 miles southwest of

Appeal Nos. 89-2*11 to 89-2416

4.

The

market

determined

by

the

$101,948.

Petitioner

value

Uintah

for

County

requests

a

the

subject

Board

of

market

property

as

Equalization

is

value

of

$8,100.

Respondent requests a market value of $101,948,
5.
mineral,

The subject property has, at the present time, no

oil,

or

mining

leases upon

it.

It was

classified

approximately ten years ago as greenbelt property and has been
recognized

as

such

by

both

parties

since

that

time.

The

subject receives no revenues from the production of minerals,
but

only

from

winter

sheep grazing.

Petitioner

receives at

least $1,000 per year from the grazing use of the land.

There

is no dispute in this case as to the subject's greenbelt status.
6.

Petitioner

its estimate of market

submitted an appraisal
value.

in support of

The appraisal is performed by

Petitioner's expert witness, Mr. Wiles, and values the subject
property

at

assumption

$3.95
that

to

the

$4.00 per acre.
highest

and

best

This is based

on the

use

subject

for

the

property is for winter sheep grazing with little or no present
potential for mineral production.
7.

Respondent's

representative

testified

that

the

subject property is valued by Respondent according to the value
established by the state in 1982, which is $50 per acre.

He

also testified as to several comparable sales of significantly
smaller tracts of land which sold within a range of $40 to $160
per acre, but did not submit any documentary support for this
testimony.

-2-

/\ppt?dl

INOb.

O^-^iil

CO

O^-ZilO

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Tax Commission
administration

is required

of property

to oversee the just

taxes to ensure that property is

valued for tax purposes according to fair market value.

(Utah

Code Ann. S3S-1-210(7).)
The Petitioner

has the burden of proof to establish

that the market value of the subject property is other than
that as determined by the Respondent.
DECISION AND ORDER
The

method

of

analysis

utilized

in

Petitioner's

appraisal does not conform to the generally accepted practices
of the appraisal profession and the Commission finds that it is
insufficient
appears

as

that

a

reliable

Petitioner's

indicator

appraisal

instead of economic or market rents.
similar properties
rent

figure

accepted
used,

of

$0.96

than

market

utilizes

value.

contract

It

rents

Current market rents for

are significantly higher than Petitioner's
(ninety-six

appraisal methodology

rather

of

contract

cents) per AUM.

requires that

market

Generally
rents

be

or actual rents, when it appears

that the contract rents do not conform to the market.
The market approach to value in Petitioner's appraisal
makes adjustments that appear to be very subjective and that
are

difficult

important

data

to

support

elements

with
are

reliable

not

market

supplied

by

data.

Some

Petitioner's

appraisal, such as the actual acreage of its comparable sales
and the

sale

dates.

It

appears

that

Petitioner's value

of

$3.95 to $4.00 per acre is substantially below market value for
similar properties in the area.

-3-

Appeal Nos. 89-?4Il to 89-2416

Respondent's
unsupported

and

comparability.

evidence,

utilizes
The

Tax

on

the

comparable
Commission

other

sales
finds

hand,

with

that

is

little

since

the

evidence presented by both parties is insufficient to indicate
a reliable value for the subject property, the matter should be
remanded to the Uintah County Board of Equalization

so that

each party may have opportunity to correct the deficiencies in
its case and submit

sufficient

evidence

and

analyses

for

an

appropriate and accurate value to be determined for the subject
property.
The Petitioner
subject

property,

greenbelt
(FAA).

and

is appealing the market value of the
not

classification

its

under

value
the

The board of equalization

as

determined

Farmland

by

its

Assessment

Act

shall, therefore, determine

the actual market value of the subject property as of the lien
date, January 1, 1989.
may

make

a

Under the law, a board of equalization

determination

regarding

the

specific

level

of

classification to which a property is to be assigned under the
FAA,

e.g.,

appeal

to

"Graze
the

I,"

"Graze

board.

A

II," etc., if that issue is on

board

of

equalization

does

not,

however, have authority to make any determination regarding the
greenbelt values established under each classification.
present

case,

the

Petitioner

has

not

In the

appealed the greenbelt

classification of the subject property under the FAA, but has
only

appealed

greenbelt
authority

the

actual

classification.
and

market value.

market

value

The board of

responsibility

to

independent

of

the

equalization

has

the

determine

the

actual

fair

Appeal Nos. 89-2

1 to 89-2416

Based upon the foregoing,

the Tax Commission

orders that

the case be remanded for further proceedings before the Uintah
County Board of Equalization for the submission of additional
evidence to address the points

indicated

in this Order,

The

board of equalization is authorized and ordered to be reopened
for this purpose.

DATED this

It is so ordered.

23

day of

1991.

BYJiRDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

iansen
Chairman

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

Pacheco
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petition for judicial review.
Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(l),
63-46b-14(2)(a).
JGL/sd/1133w

-5-

Appeal Nos. 89-2411 to 89-2416

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
Uintah Oil Association
c/o Edward M. Bown
225 South 200 East, Suite 150
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Lorin Merkley
Uintah County Assessor
County Courthouse
Vernal, UT
84078
Amy G. Pope
Uintah County Auditor
County Courthouse
Vernal, UT
84078
DATED this

£

ft

^O^JL,

day of ^ 7 \ Q A A ^ ~

'Secretary

-6-

, 1991

AT^

I

Appeal NOS. ay-2411 to ey-/4ib

ATTACHMENT
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL

NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER

89
89
89
89
89
89

2411
2412
2413
2414
2415
2416
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SERIAL
SERIAL
SERIAL
SERIAL
SERIAL
SERIAL

NUMBER:
NUMBER:
NUMBER:
NUMBER:
NUMBER:
NUMBER:

11-025-0001
ll-026-Q0J)l
11-027-0001
11-028-0001
10-093-0001
10-094-0001

BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
UTAH SHALE LAND &
MINERALS CORP.,

)
Petitioner,

v.

)

ORDER

)

COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF )
UINTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH,
)
Respondent.

Appeal Nos. 89-2374 to
89-2410
Serial Nos. see attached

)

STATEMENT OF CASE
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission
for a formal hearing on October 11, 1990.

Joseph G. Linford,

Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the
Commission.

Present

and

representing

the

Petitioner

were

R. Dennis Ickes, Attorney at Law, Edward M. Bown, Attorney at
Law,

and

Steven

L.

Wiles.

Present

and

representing

the

Respondent was Lorin Merkley, Uintah County Assessor.
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The tax in question is property tax.

2.

The

period

in

question

is

the

lien

date

January 1, 1989.
3.
of vacant

The subject property consists of 19,200.52 acres
land

Vernal, Utah.

located

approximately

65 miles southwest of

Appeal Nos. 89-7 ^4 to 89-2410

4.

The

market

determined

by

the

$960,026.

Petitioner

value

Uintah

for

County

requests

a

the

subject

Board

of

market

property

as

Equalization

is

value

of

$75,400.

Respondent requests a market value of $960,026.
iTr
mineral,

The subject property has, at the present time, no

oil, or mining

leases

upon

it.

It was

classified

approximately ten years ago as greenbelt property and has been
recognized

as

such

by

both

parties

since

that

time.

The

subject receives no revenues from the production of minerals,
but

only

from winter

sheep

grazing.

Petitioner

receives at

least $1,000 per year from the grazing use of the land.

There

is no dispute in this case as to the subject's greenbelt status.
6.

Petitioner

submitted

its estimate of market value.

an appraisal

in support of

The appraisal is performed by

Petitioner's expert witness, Mr. Wiles, and values the subject
property

at

assumption

$3.95
that

to $4.00 per

the

highest

and

acre.
best

This
use

is based on the
for

the

subject

property is for winter sheep grazing with little or no present
potential for mineral production.
7.

Respondent's

representative

testified

that

the

subject property is valued by Respondent according to the value
established by the state in 1982, which is $50 per acre.

He

also testified as to several comparable sales of significantly
smaller tracts of land which sold within a range of $40 to $160
per acre, but did not submit any documentary support for this
testimony.
-2-

Appeal Nos. 89-2' '4 to 89-2410
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just
administration of property taxes to ensure that property is
valued for tax purposes according to fair market value.

(Utah

Code Ann. §59-1-210(7).)
The Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish
that the market value of the subject property is other than
that as determined by the Respondent.
DECISION AND ORDER
The

method

of

analysis

utilized

in

Petitioner's

appraisal does not conform to the generally accepted practices
of the appraisal profession and the Commission finds that it is
insufficient

as

a reliable

appears that Petitioner's

indicator

of market value.

It

appraisal utilizes contract rents

instead of economic or market rents.

Current market rents for

similar properties are significantly higher than Petitioner's
rent figure of $0.96 (ninety-six cents) per AUM.

Generally

accepted appraisal methodology requires that market rents be
used, rather than contract or actual rents, when it appears
that the contract rents do not conform to the market.
The market approach to value in Petitioner's appraisal
makes adjustments that appear to be very subjective and that
are difficult
important

data

to support with reliable market data.
elements

are

not

supplied

by

Some

Petitioner's

appraisal, such as the actual acreage of its comparable sales
and the sale dates.

It appears that Petitioner's value of

$3.95 to $4.00 per acre is substantially below market value for
similar properties in the area.

Appeal Nos. 89-2

4 to 89-2410

Respondent's
unsupported

and

comparability.

evidence,

utilizes
The

Tax

on

the

comparable
Commission

other

sales
finds

hand,

with

that

is

little

since

the

evidence presented by both parties is insufficient to indicate
a reliable value for the subject property, the matter should be
remanded to the Uintah County Board of

Equalization

so that

each party may have opportunity to correct the deficiencies in
its case and submit

sufficient

evidence and

analyses

for

an

appropriate and accurate value to be determined for the subject
property.
The Petitioner
subject

property,

greenbelt
(FAA).

and

is appealing the market value of the
not

classification

its

under

value
the

The board of equalization

as

determined

Farmland

by

its

Assessment

Act

shall, therefore, determine

the actual market value of the subject property as of the lien
date, January 1, 1989.
may

make

a

Under the law, a board of equalization

determination

regarding

the

specific

level

of

classification to which a property is to be assigned under the
FAA, e.g.,

"Graze

appeal

the

to

I,"

"Graze II," etc.,

board.

A

board

of

if that issue is on

equalization

does

not,

however, have authority to make any determination regarding the
greenbelt values established under each classification.
present

case,

the

Petitioner

has

not

In the

appealed the greenbelt

classification of the subject property under the FAA, but has
only

appealed

greenbelt
authority

the

actual

classification.
and

market value.

market

value

The board

responsibility

to

of

independent

of

the

equalization

has

the

determine

the

actual

fair

Appeal Nos. 89-2^4 to 89-2410

Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission

orders that

the case be remanded for further proceedings before the Uintah
County Board of Equalization for the submission of additional
evidence to address the points

indicated

in this Order.

The

board of equalization is authorized and ordered to be reopened
for this purpose.
DATED this

It is so ordered.
£8

day of

1991.

BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION.

G. Blaine Davis
Commissioner

Toe B, Pacheco
Commissioner

NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a
petition for judicial review.
Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(l),
63-46b-14(2)(a).
JGL/sd/1130w
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Appeal Nos. 89-r n4 to 89-2410

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Decision to the following:
Utah Shale Land & Minerals Corp.
c/o Nielsen & Senior - R. Dennis Ickes
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, UT
84111
Lorin Merkley
Uintah County Assessor
County Courthouse
Vernal, UT
84078
Amy G. Pope
Uintah County Auditor
County Courthouse
Vernal, UT
84078
DATED this

£8

day of

n\ouxJ^^

^Secretary

-6-

, 1991.

^~Y\
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ATTACHMENT

APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL
APPEAL

NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER :
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER
NUMBER.
NUMBER.
NUMBER:
NUMBER.
NUMBER:
NUMBER:

89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89
89

2374
2375
2376
2377
2378
2379
2380
2381
2382
2383
2384
2385
2386
2387
2388
2389
2390
2391
2392
2393
2394
2395
2396
2397
2398
2399
2400
2401
2402
2403
2404
2405
2406
2407
2408
2409
2410
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SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL-JTOMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER
SERIAL NUMBER
SERIAL NUMBER
SERIAL NUMBER
SERIAL NUMBER
SERIAL NUMBER
SERIAL NUMBER .
SERIAL NUMBER .
SERIAL NUMBER .
SERIAL NUMBER .
SERIAL NUMBER .
SERIAL NUMBER
SERIAL NUMBER •
SERIAL NUMBER •
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER :
SERIAL NUMBER.
SERIAL NUMBER:
SERIAL NUMBER:

10--079--0001
10--080--0001
10--081--0001
10--082--0001
10--083--0001
10--084--0001
10--085--0001
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STATES CONSTITUTION, Fourteenth Amendment,

AMENDMENT 14
Section 1. Citizens of the United States.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. Representatives—Power to reduce apportionment.
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.
Sec. 3. Disqualification to hold office.
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath,
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Sec. 4. Public debt not to be questioned—Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or
10
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obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slaves; but all such
debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Sec. 5.

Power to enforce amendment.

The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

11

STATE CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 2

Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value ascertained — Exemptions — Remittance or abatement of taxes of poor — Intangible property —
Legislature to provide annual tax for state.]
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law.
(2) The following are property tax exemptions:
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries;
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city,
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to
the ad valorem property tax;
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes;
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; and
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute. This
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by
statute.
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be exempted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or produced or otherwise originating within or without the state.
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., held for
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted.
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants,
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corporations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxation to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes.
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for
generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which is used for

furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the
state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the extent that such property
is used for such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may
prescribe.
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in
such manner as may be provided by law.
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of
not to exceed 45% of the fair market value of residential property as defined
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclusively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for
himself and family.
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the military service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were
killed in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the
Legislature may provide.
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legislature may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also
be taxed. Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation.
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there
be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years
from the final passage of the law creating the debt.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1930 (Spec. Sess.),
S.J.R. 2; 1945, H.J.R. 3; 1957, H.J.R. 7; 1961,
S.J.R. 6; 1963, S.J.R. 5; 1967, S.J.R. 1; 1982,
S.J.R. 3; 1986, H.J.R. 18.
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1959, Senate
Joint Resolution No. 5 proposed a constitutional amendment to be voted oa by the electors at the general election in 1960. The proposed amendment failed to pass because it did
not receive the necessary majority.
The 1979 proposed amendments to this section by House Joint Resolutions Nos. 23 and 25
were repealed and withdrawn by Senate Joint
Resolution No. 6, Laws 1980.
Laws 1986, Senate Joint Resolution No. 4,
proposed to amend Subsection (2)(c) of this section. The proposed amendment was submitted
to the electors at the general election in 1986
and failed to pass because it did not receive the
necessary majority.
Cross-References. — Armories exempt
from taxation, § 39-2-1.
Civil Air Patrol equipment exempt, § 2-1-41.

County service area property exempt,
§ 17A-2-429.
Disabled veteran's exemption, §§ 59-2-1104,
59-2-1105.
Exemptions generally, § 59-2-1101 et seq.,
Chapter 23 of Title 78
i n d i g ent persons, abatement or deferral of
t a x e s > § § 59 _ 2 _ii07 to 59-2-1109.
I n d u s t r i a l facilities development property
t 8 n 17 10
*#•
j . . " , .
.
M m e and m m n g claim i m p r o
'
?T2?* Tf
u
ch
™ 1 T 1 ° r s t r u c t u r e s n o t exem P*> § 5 9 " 5 - 6 4 '
Privilege tax on possession and use of taxexem
P t properties, § 51-4-101.
Property of higher education institutions exempt, § 53B-20-106.
Property tax relief, § 59-2-1201 et seq.
Rate of assessment of property, § 59-2-103.
School property exempt from taxation,
§ 53A-3-408.
Tangible personal property held for sale on
January 1 exempt, § 59-2-1114.

UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 3

Sec, 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property —
Livestock — Land used for agricultural purposes.]
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assessment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money,
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature shall
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the
Legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock.
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes,
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the
value it may have for other purposes.
History: Const. 1896; Nov. 6, 1900; Nov. 6,
1906; L. 1930 (S.S.), S.J.R. 2; 1946 (1st S.S.),
H.J.R. 2; 1967, S.J.R. 2; 1982, S.J.R. 3.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1979 proposed
amendment of this section by House Joint Res-

olution No. 23 was repealed and withdrawn by
Senate Joint Resolution No. 6, Laws 1980.
Cross-References. — Uniform School
Fund, taxes allocated to, § 53A-16-101.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

In general.
"According to value in money" construed.
Charitable association.
Co-operative corporation property.
County clerk's probate fees.
County improvement district contingent tax.
Disparity in state and county assessment.
Double taxation.
Drainage assessments.

Occupation and license taxes.
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane persons.
Road poll taxes.
Roll-back of assessed value.
Special assessments.
State property.
Telephone license tax.
Uniformity and equality.
Utility rates.
Cited.
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59-1-210. General powers and duties.
The powers and duties of the commission are as follows:
(1) to sue and be sued in its own name;
(2) to adopt rules and policies consistent with the Constitution and
laws of this state to govern the commission, executive director, division
directors, and commission employees in the performance of their duties;
(3) to adopt rules and policies consistent with the Constitution and
laws of the state, to govern county boards and officers in the performance
of any duty relating to assessment, equalization, and collection of taxes;
(4) to prescribe the use of forms relating to the assessment of property
for state or local taxation, the equalization of those assessments, the
reporting of property or income for state or local taxation purposes, or for
the computation of those taxes and the reporting of any information,
statistics, or data required by the commission;
(5) to administer and supervise the tax laws of the state;
(6) to prepare and maintain from year to year a complete record of all
lands subject to taxation in this state, and all machinery used in mining
and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines
or mining claims;
(7) to exercise general supervision over assessors and county boards of
equalization, and over other county officers in the performance of their
duties relating to the assessment of property and collection of taxes, so
that all assessments of property are just and equal, according to fair
market value, and that the tax burden is distributed without favor or
discrimination;
(8) to reconvene any county board of equalization which, when reconvened, may only address business approved by the commission and extend
the time for which any county board of equalization may sit for the equalization of assessments;
(9) to confer with, advise, and direct county treasurers, assessors, and
other county officers in matters relating to the assessment and equalization of property for taxation and the collection of taxes;
(10) to provide for and hold annually at such time and place as may be
convenient a district or state convention of county assessors, auditors, and
other county officers to consider and discuss matters relative to taxation,
uniformity of valuation, and changes in the law relative to taxation and
methods of assessment, to which county assessors and other officers called
to attend shall attend at county expense;
(11) to direct proceedings, actions, and prosecutions to enforce the laws
relating to the penalties, liabilities, and punishments of public officers,

persons, and officers or agents or corporations for failure or neglect to
comply with the statutes governing the reporting, assessment, and taxation of property;
(12) to cause complaints to be made in the proper court seeking removal from office of assessors, auditors, members of county boards, and
other assessing, taxing, or disbursing officers, who are guilty of official
misconduct or neglect of duty;
(13) to require county attorneys to immediately institute and prosecute
actions and proceedings in respect to penalties, forfeitures, removals, and
punishments for violations of the laws relating to the assessment and
taxation of property in their respective counties;
(14) to require any person to furnish any information required by the
commission to ascertain the value and the relative burden borne by all
kinds of property in the state, and to require from all state and local
officers any information necessary for the proper discharge of the duties
of the commission;
(15) to examine all records relating to the valuation of property of any
person;
(16) to subpoena witnesses to appear and give testimony and produce
records relating to any matter before the commission;
(17) to cause depositions of eyewitnesses to be taken as in civil actions
at the request of the commission or any party to any matter or proceeding
before the commission;
(18) to authorize any member or employee of the commission to administer oaths and affirmations in any matter or proceeding relating to the
exercise of the powers and duties of the commission;
(19) to visit periodically each county of the state, to investigate and
direct the work and methods of local assessors and other officials in the
assessment, equalization, and taxation of property, and to ascertain
whether the law requiring the assessment of all property not exempt from
taxation, and the collection of taxes, have been properly administered and
enforced;
(20) to carefully examine all cases where evasion or violation of the
laws for assessment and taxation of property is alleged, to ascertain
whether existing laws are defective or improperly administered;
(21) to furnish to the governor from time to time such assistance and
information as the governor requires;
(22) to transmit to the governor and to each member of the Legislature
recommendations as to legislation which will correct or eliminate defects
in the operation of the tax laws and will equalize the burden of taxation
within the state;
(23) to correct any error in any assessment made by it at any time
before the tax is due and report the correction to the county auditor, who
shall enter the corrected assessment upon the assessment roll;
(24) to compile and publish statistics relating to taxation in the state
and prepare and submit an annual budget to the governor for inclusion in
the state budget to be submitted to the Legislature;
(25) to perform any further duties imposed by law, and exercise all
powers necessary in the performance of its duties;
(26) to adopt a schedule of fees assessed for services provided by the
commission, unless otherwise provided by statute. The fee shall be rea-

sonable and fair, and shall reflect the cost of services provided. Each fee
established in this manner shall be submitted to and approved by the
Legislature as part of the commission's annual appropriations request.
The commission may not charge or collect any fee proposed in this manner without approval by the Legislature; and
(27) to comply with the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b,
Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings.
History: C. 1953, 59-1-210, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 4, § 36; 1987, ch. 161, § 210.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment by Chapter 161, effective January 1,
1988, added Subsection (27).
Compiler's Notes. — Former § 59-5-46, as
last amended by Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 15,
§ 19, contained provisions similar to this section. Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 220 purported to
amend former § 59-5-46, effective January 1,
1988, but the amendment could not be given
effect because the prior repeal of § 59-5-46 by
Laws 1987. ch. 4, § 306.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 4, § 308
makes the act effective on February 6, 1987.
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 4, § 307 provides: "This act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1987, except for
Sections 59-2-201, 59-2-205, and 59-2-207,
which take effect January 1, 1988."
Cross-References. — Constitutional duties,
Const. Art. Xm, § 11.
Increase or lowering of assessments,
§ 59-2-1014.
Uniform system of accounts, § 59-1-211.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Actions by and against commission.
Appeals.
—"Informal" hearing.
Assessments.
Changing valuation of property.
Contempt power.
Duties.
Equalization of assessments.
Legality of tax.
Liability of commission.
Local assessments.
Violation of tax law.
Actions by and against commission.
Under Subsection (1), the State Tax Commission may sue in its own name for collection
of taxes, such as the sales tax. State Tax
Comm'n v. City of Logan, 88 Utah 406, 54 P.2d
1197 (1936).
Appeals.
The State Tax Commission has more than
mere administrative duties; it is also clothed
with quasi-judicial duties and functions, and
hence is subject in proper cases to review of its
decisions by certiorari, where such decision,
ruling or order materially affects the substantial rights of the applicant for the writ, and
was made because of a wrong interpretation of
the law or a failure to follow or apply the law,
or where it is against the undisputed evidence,
provided always there is no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law. Board of Equalization v. State Tax

Comm'n, 88 Utah 219, 50 P.2d 418, rehearing
denied, 88 Utah 228, 54 P.2d 1214 (1935).
—"Informal" hearing.
Even though commission's Code of Administrative Procedure provided for "informal" and
then "formal" hearing on tax questions, taxpayer's failure to apply for formal hearing before taking appeal to Supreme Court from "decision" at informal hearing was not improper;
statutory provisions and other rules in Code
justify procedure followed by taxpayer. Nelson
v. State Tax Comm'n, 29 Utah2d 162, 506 P.2d
437, afTd, 532 P.2d 680 (Utah 1973).
Assessments.
Tax commission may cancel, change or vacate an assessment upon proper showing.
Board of Equalization v. State Tax Comm'n, 88
Utah 219, 50 P.2d 418, rehearing denied, 88
Utah 228, 54 P.2d 1214 (1935).
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59-2-102.

Definitions.

As used in this chapter and title:
^ noeTY , onf n f
(1) "Assessment roll" means a permanent record of the assessment of
property as assessed by the county assessor and the c o m m l n S f X ^ e 3
be maintained manually or as a computerized file as a corLSolxdated recor^
or as multiple records by type, classification, or categories. A * ? ™ " *
roll" includes assessment books, assessment lists, assessors lists, ana
other such materials.
, . ,
. , „,_„IJ
(2) "Fair market value" means the amount at which P r o P ^ ^ n J
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, wittier being
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant facts.
,.
(3) "Farm machinery and equipment," for purposes of the exemption
provided under Subsection 59-2-1101(1X0, means tractors, milking equipment and storage and cooling facilities, feed handling equipment, irriga-

tion equipment, harvesters, choppers, grain drills and planters, tillage
tools, scales, combines, spreaders, sprayers, haying equipment, and any
other machinery or equipment used primarily for agricultural purposes;
but does not include vehicles required to be registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles or vehicles or other equipment used for business
purposes other than farming.
(4) "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences,
and improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title
has been acquired to the land or not. "Improvements" also includes a
mobile home as defined in § 59-2-601, located on land owned by the person who owns the mobile home. For purposes of this subsection "land
owned" includes a vendee in possession of the land under a land contract.
(5) "Metalliferous minerals" includes, but is not limited to, gold, silver,
copper, lead, zinc, and uranium.
(6) "Mine" means a natural deposit of either metalliferous or
nonmetalliferous valuable mineral.
(7) "Mining" means the process of producing, extracting, leaching,
evaporating, or otherwise removing a mineral from a mine.
(8) "Nonmetalliferous minerals" includes, but is not limited to, oil, gas,
coal, salts, sand, rock, gravel, and all carboniferous materials.
(9) "Personal property" includes:
(a) every class of property as defined in Subsection (9) [Subsection
(10)] which is the subject of ownership and not included within the
meaning of the terms "real estate" and "improvements";
(b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or alleys;
(c) bridges and ferries; and
(d) livestock which, for the purposes of the exemption provided
under § 59-2-1111, means all domestic animals, honeybees, poultry,
fur-bearing animals, and fish.
(10) "Property" means property which is subject to assessment and
taxation according to its value, but does not include moneys, credits,
bonds, stocks, representative property, franchises, goodwill, copyrights,
patents, or other intangibles.
(11) "Public utility," for purposes of this chapter, means the operating
property of a railroad, common carrier, gas corporation, oil or gas transportation or pipeline company, coal slurry pipeline company, electrical
corporation, telephone corporation, sewerage corporation, or heat corporation where the company performs the service for, or delivers the commodity to, the public generally or companies serving the public generally, or
in the case of gas corporation or electrical corporation, where the gas or
electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the
state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use. Public utility also
means the operating property of any entity or person defined under
§ 54-2-1 except warehousemen and water corporations.
(12) "Real estate" includes:
(a) the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the possession of, land;
(b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all
timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or being on
the lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privileges appertaining thereto; and

(c) improvements.
(13) "Residential property," for the purposes of the reductions and adjustments under this chapter, means any property used for residential
purposes as a primary residence. It does not include property used for
transient residential use or condominiums used in rental pools.
(14) "Tax roll" means a permanent record of the taxes charged on property, as extended on the assessment roll, and may be maintained on the
same record or records as the assessment roll or may be maintained on a
separate record properly indexed to the assessment roll. "Tax roll" includes tax books, tax lists, and other such materials.
History: C. 1953, 59-2-102, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 4, § 49; 1987, ch. 93, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment by Chapter 93, effective April 27, 1987
added present Subsection (3) and redesignated
former Subsections (3) through (13) as present
Subsections (4) through (14).
Compiler's Notes. — Former § 59-3-1, as
amended by Laws 1986, ch. 57, § 26 contained
provisions similar to this section.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 4, § 308
makes the act effective on February 6, 1987.

Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
4, § 307, provides: "This act has retrospect ive operation to January 1, 1987, except for
Sections 59-2-201, 59-2-205, and 59-2-207,
whkh ^
effect J a
± 19g8 „
, no R 0
.,
«<„«.
.
T
100f7
L a w s 1987
> c h ' 93 > § 3 . P r ™ d e s ; ^
«?
u
has
retrospective operation to January 1,
1987."
Cross-References. — Railroad rolling stock
as personalty, Utah Const. Art. XII, § 14.

c h.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
"Real estate."
An engine and boiler built into a brick foundation and firmly affixed by bolts leaded down
and used in underground workings of a mine

are included in term "real estate." Mammoth
Mining Co. v. Juab County, 10 Utah 232, 37 P.
348 (1894).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Brigham Young Law Review. — Software
Taxation: A Critical Reevaluation of the Notion of Intangibility, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 859.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and
Local Taxation §§ 1, 2.

C.J.S. — 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 66.
Key Numbers. — Taxation <*= 58.
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59-2-502.

Definitions.

As used in this part:
(1) "Land in agricultural use" means:
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful plants and animals, such
as:
(i) forages and sod crops;
(ii) grains and feed crops;
(iii) livestock as defined in Subsection 59-2-102 (8)(d) [Subsection 59-2-102(9)(d)];
(iv) trees and fruits; or
(v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock; or
(b) land devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifications or payments or other compensation under a crop-land retirement program with an agency of the state or federal government.
(2) "Roll-back" means the period preceding the withdrawal of the land
from the provisions of this part or the change in use of the land, not to
exceed five years, during which the land is valued, assessed, and taxed
under this part.
History: C. 1953, 59-5-88, enacted by L.
1969, ch. 180, § 3; renumbered by L. 1987,
ch. 4, § 104.
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amendment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered
this section which was formerly § 59-5-88 and
rewrote the section, adding Subsection (2).

Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987,
ch. 4, § 307 provides: "This act has retrospective operation to January 1, 1987, except for
Sections 59-2-201, 59-2-205, and 59-2-207,
which take effect January 1, 1988."
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63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court.
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following:
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
736
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "As
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals" for "The Supreme Court or
other appellate court designated by statute" in
Subsection (1); inserted "with the appropriate

appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and substituted "appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b).
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,
§ 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1,
1988

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court.
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis-

trict court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
§ 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32
(Utah Ct. App. 1988).

63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief,
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may:
(i) order agency action required by law;
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the efFee ive date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings.
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are reviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute.
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 273.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161,

§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.
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R861-1-7A. Evidence in Adjudicatory Proceedings Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections
59-1-210, 76-8-502, 76-8-503, 63-46b-8.
A. Introduction of Evidence. Every party appearing before the Commission has the right to introduce
evidence. Such evidence may be oral or written, real
or demonstrative, direct or circumstantial.
B. Presiding Officer. Any presiding officer, as set
forth in Rule R861-1-1A, may preside at any proceeding. The presiding officer shall rule and sign orders
on matters concerning the evidentiary and procedural conduct of the proceeding.
C. Sworn Testimony, Oral testimony at a formal
hearing will be 6worn. The oath will be administered
by the presiding officer or a person designated by
him. Anyone testifying falsely under oath may be
subject to prosecution for perjury in accordance with
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Sections 76-8-502
and 76-8-503.
D. Exclusion of Evidence. The Commission may
exclude evidence as being irrelevant, immaterial, or
unduly repetitious. It will not be bound, however, by
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judicial tests of admissibility of evidence, but it may
admit any reliable evidence possessing probative
value which would be accepted by a reasonably prudent man in the conduct of his affairs. The Commission may admit that kind of evidence known as hearsay if such evidence meets this test; however, no decision of the Commission will be based solely on hearsay evidence.
E. Excluded Preferred Evidence. If a party attempts to introduce evidence into a hearing, only to
have such evidence excluded for any of the reasons
above listed, he may require that such excluded testimony or evidence be placed in the record to allow the
reviewing judicial authority to pass on the correctness of the ruling of exclusion on appeal. If such excluded evidence is deemed by the presiding officer to
be repetitive, redundant, or unnecessarily lengthy, he
may require the inclusion of such testimony in the
record in condensed form.
F. Order of Presentation. The order of presentation
of evidence at a hearing is at the discretion of the
presiding officer, but he will be guided by the question of who at a given point must sustain the burden
of proof.
G. Burden of Proof. The petitioning party shall
have the burden of proof to establish that his petition
should be granted.
H. Degree of Proof. The degree of proof in a hearing before the Commission shall be the same as in a
judicial proceeding brought in the state courts of
Utah.
I. Presentation of Commission's Case. The Commission's case will be presented by the office of the
Attorney General or by employees or authorized representatives of the Commission.
J. Official Notice. The Commission shall take official notice of:
1. the laws of the United States;
2. the laws of the state of Utah;
3. ail public and private official acts of the various
agencies and divisions of the executive, legislative,
and judicial departments of the United States and of
the state of Utah and its political subdivisions;
4. the official enacted statutes of the various states
of the United States;
5. seals of the United States and the state of Utah
and all agencies and divisions thereof, including the
seals of courts and of notary publics;
6. the true, significant meaning of all words in the
English language, including commonly used abbreviations and symbols; and
7. the laws of science, the geography of the world,
and the divisions of time, space, weight, and measure.
8. The Commission may also take official notice of
other matters of common knowledge and general acceptance and of publications or other commonly available information widely used and accepted in tax assessment. Any party to the proceeding has the right
to rebut or otherwise address the officially noticed
material.
9. In relation to the above, the Commission reserves the right to resort to appropriate reference materials in discovering and interpreting these matters
and to rule on the admissibility or inadmissibility of
these matters as to competence, materiality, and redundancy.
K. Official Commission Records and Documents.
AH records and documents prepared by officials and
employees of the Commission in performance of their
official duties are prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein. Such records and documents shall be
presumed to show the truth, but this presumption
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may be rebutted. The Commission may refer to and
rely upon these records in making decisions. If a ruling is based in whole or in part on such records, the
party affected by such ruling will have a right to examine them, unless such examination is prohibited
by law, in which instance he will be apprised of the
nature and contents of such records to the degree permissible under the terms of the law involved. No decision will be based solely on privileged or nonpublic
records.
L. Commission Knowledge and Investigation. The
Commission may, in formulating its decision, rely
upon its specialized knowledge and experience in taxation and tax administration and upon evidence discovered by its staff. However, no findings shall be
based upon these matters without notification to the
adverse party of the matters relied upon.
M. Experts. Experts may testify in Commission
hearings on behalf of any party of their special
knowledge and competence.
N. Privilege. The Commission will give effect to all
rules of privilege recognized by law. If a party asserting the truth of a certain claim, however, asserts a
privilege in relation to evidence which would tend to
support or refute such claim, and this evidence is particularly or solely available to him or those in a close
interest or family relationship, and he can produce no
evidence beyond this assertion, the Commission will
reject such assertion. This rule will not apply, however, where the applicable law of privilege gives him
no option but demands that he assert the claim of
privilege in the particular situation.
0. Uncontradicted Evidence. The Commission will
accept uncontradicted evidence, unless inherently improbable, as being true. However, where such evidence is solely and exclusively in the possession of the
one offering the same or where it would be impossible
or extremely difficult for the adverse party to obtain
rebuttal evidence, the Commission reserves the right
to give such uncontradicted evidence only the weight
deemed fair, just, and proper.
P. Cross Examination and Rebuttal. Any party to a
Commission proceeding has the right to cross examine any witness testifying and to submit evidence in
rebuttal of his testimony, which right shall include
the right to challenge credibility or veracity of any
witness or evidence offered.
Q. Stipulation. Any party in an adjudicative proceeding may stipulate as to any fact or issue, and
such stipulation may be introduced into a proceeding
as evidence and may constitute the basis for an order.
R. Precedents. The Commission may rely in its decision making upon precedents from previous hearings, but it is not bound by the doctrine of stare decisis.
S. Memoranda of Authority. Any party appearing
before the Commission may submit a memorandum
of authorities if he so wishes. The Commission may
request such a memorandum from any party if
deemed necessary for a full and informed consideration of the problem.
T. The Commission may relax the rules within the
limits prescribed by law in informal proceedings in
the interests of equity, expediency, and economy.
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R86M-9A

R861-1-9A. Tax Commission as Board of Equalization Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections
59-5-212, 69-2-1003, and 69-2-1011.
A. Equalization Responsibilities. The Commission
will sit as the State Board of Equalization in discharge of the equalization responsibilities given it by
law. The Commission may sit on its own initiative to
correct the valuation of property which has been
overassessed, underassessed, or nonassessed as described in Utah Code Ann. Section 59-2-212; and as a
board of appeal from the various county boards of
equalization as described in Utah Code Ann. Section
59-2-1011.
B. Proceedings. A presiding officer may sit as the
State Board of Equalization with the same force and
effect as if the entire Commission were present Any
order will be signed by a quorum of the Commission
after they have become familiar with the evidence
and have reviewed the legal arguments of the parties
with the presiding officer.
C. Appeals from County Boards. An appeal from a
decision of a County Board of Equalization must be
presented upon the same issues as were submitted to
the county board in the first instance. The Commission shall consider but is not limited to, the facts and
evidence submitted to the county board.
D. Remand of Insufficient Appeal. The Commission may remand an appeal to the County Board of
Equalization if:
1. the minutes of the county board fail to conform
with the requirements of Rule R861-1-9A-E, or
2. in the interest of effective tax administration
the matter can best be resolved by the county board.
The Commission shall notify the county board of
the order and the county board shall schedule a rehearing on the appeal within 20 days of the issuance
of the notice.
E. Minutes of the County Board. The County
Board of Equalization or county hearing officer shall
prepare minutes of hearings held before them on
property tax appeals. The minutes shall include:
1. the name and address of the property owner,
2. the identification number, location, and description of the property;
3. the value placed on the property by the assessor;
4. the basis stated in the taxpayer's appeal;
5. facts and issues raised in the hearing before the
county board which are not clearly evident from the
assessor's records; and
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6. the decision of the County Board of Equalization
and the reasons for the decision.
F. Exempt Property. The County Board of Equalization shall, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Sections 59-2-1003 and 59-2-1011, with respect to a decision affecting the exempt status of a property, prepare its decision in writing stating the reasons and
statutory basis for the decision.
G. Manner of Conducting Proceedings. Except as
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the provisions of Rules R861-1-4A, 6A, 6A, and 7A shall be
applicable to proceedings before the State Board of
Equalization.
H. Definition of Statement "Within Ten Days" as
Referred to in Utah Code Ann. Section 59-2-1011.
The term "within ten days after the final action of the
county board," as used in Utah Code Ann. Section
59-2-1011, means that a taxpayer shall have ten
days, exclusive of weekends and holidays, from the
date the county auditor mails the decision of the
County Board of Equalization to the taxpayer, to appeal that decision to the State Board of Equalization.
For purposes of Utah Code Ann. Section 59-2-1011,
the taxpayer's appeal shall be considered to have
been filed on:
1. the date the notice of appeal which is mailed to
the county auditor's office is postmarked, or
2. the date hand-delivered to the county auditor's
office, or
3. a notice filed by the taxpayer shall be presumed
to have been timely filed unless the county auditor
provides convincing evidence to the contrary, [n the
absence of evidence of the date of mailing of the
County Board of Equalization decision by the county
auditor to the taxpayer, it shall be presumed that the
decision was mailed three days after the meeting of
the County Board of Equalization at which the decision was made.

